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Religious Figures, Insurgency, and 
Jihad in Southern Afghanistan
!omas H. Johnson
THOMAS H. JOHNSON is a faculty member of the National Security A#airs 
Department at the Naval Postgraduate School as well as the Director of the 
Program for Culture and Con&ict Studies. For two decades, Professor Johnson 
has conducted research and written on Afghanistan and South Asia. He spent 
much of the summers of 2008 and 2009 in Afghanistan conducting !eld research 
for a book manuscript on the culture and implications of the Taliban as expressed 
through their narratives, especially in the form of shabnamah or “night letters,” 
poetry, and music.
NOTE The views expressed in this essay should not be construed as an official 
position or policy of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Naval 
Postgraduate School. This article would have been virtually impossible to 
complete had it not been for the generous data supplied to the author by a 
colleague and Kandahar City resident under the pseudonym Conrad Jennings. 
His data, based on observations and interviews conducted over the last three 
years in Loy Kandahar, complemented much of the author’s own data gathered 
in Kandahar and Helmand in August–September 2008 and May–June 2009. The 
author would also like to thank Matthew Dearing, Matthew Dupee, M. Chris 
Mason, Wali Ahmed Shaaker, Ahmad Waheed, and two anonymous reviewers 
for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"is essay examines the social and political roles of religious !gures in southern 
Afghanistan in an attempt to develop a more nuanced understanding of the present 
insurgency. 
MAIN FINDINGS
xIslamic groups and Afghan mullahs play a critical role in politics in southern Afghanistan. 
"e Taliban, Deobandis, Su!s, and Tablighi Jamaat are the most important religious 
groups and in&uences in southern Afghanistan. 
xReligion and politics are blurred as religious authorities frequently shi$ between religious 
and political roles. "e West has had a tendency to misunderstand the relevance and 
implications of these roles. 
xJihad is an important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. Large numbers of 
southern insurgents are waging jihad for the implementation of sharia (Islamic law). 
Several predominant religious !gures and in&uences tend to advocate jihad. "e West 
has underestimated the role of jihad in the present Taliban movement.
x"e ulema council in southern Afghanistan represents a sector of the clergy that has 
remained relatively un-radicalized by war. Insurgents and jihadists have frequently 
assassinated members of this council because it o#ers legitimate opposition to the 
Taliban’s radicalization of young madrasah students and unemployed villagers. 
x"e political activities of two Islamic groups that represent a large number of rural 
and poor Afghans are misunderstood. Some Su! groups in Kandahar have allied with 
insurgents since 2003 and have promoted rural resistance to secular authority. "e 
Tablighi Jamaat, though avowedly apolitical and detached from the insurgency, has a 
relationship with the mujahedeen who regularly attend this group’s meetings.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
xPolitical and military strategies aimed at countering the Taliban insurgency while 
ignoring the Taliban jihad are ill-founded and will probably not succeed.
xCurrently there is very little contact between NATO or ISAF and the ulema of southern 
Afghanistan. Rather than stereotype all religious leaders and institutions as militant 
fundamentalist, policies that incorporate certain religious groups into civil society 
should be considered.
x"ere is a critical need to !x the corrupt justice system in Afghanistan. A central 
component of the Taliban’s strategy to win the trust and con!dence of the Afghan 
population is based on the role of Taliban mullahs as arbitrators of individual and 
community disputes. "is “shadow” justice system is proving very popular.
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!e more we stress Islam as a unit of analysis, the more we face the dangers of 
abstraction and unwarranted generalization. Islam keeps us mired in debates 
about normativity, where an emphasis on Muslims allows us to appreciate the 
dynamic nature of Islam as a lived experience.1
Religious authorities play a critical role in the present con&ict in Afghanistan.
2 Consider, 
for example, the fact that virtually all Taliban leaders, from the senior regional leadership 
down to subcommanders at the district level, are mullahs3 (religious leaders).4 Indeed it is 
reasonable to argue that the present con&ict in Afghanistan represents a classic insurgency 
wrapped in the religious narratives of jihad.5 Although a broad majority of the foot soldiers in this 
insurgency might be “accidental guerrillas,”6 the leaders are for the most part committed Afghan 
religious !gures.7 Hence, to understand this con&ict and its nuances, it is important to attempt to 
understand the religious !gures and phenomena in Afghanistan as well as their societal roles.8 
"e role of religious !gures in insurgencies and jihads has been a mainstay of Afghanistan’s 
history. David Edwards argues that Afghan religious personalities are central to the moral 
authority as well as to the “contradictions” of Afghan society. "ese contradictions together with 
the “arti!ciality of the Afghan nation-state” re&ect critical, historical components of the “deep 
structure” of Afghan con&ict.9 Regimes ranging from Hamid Karzai’s to the era of Amanullah 
Khan (1919–29) have been existentially threatened by, and have had di%culties in subduing, 
rural religious conservative insurgencies. "is has especially been the case when Afghan state 
authority has been perceived to challenge or o#end traditional Islamic values. "e national 
political dominance in Afghan politics of organized religious groups compared to dynastic 
monarchical groups, however, is a rather new phenomenon.10 Historically, the degree of regime 
success in subduing an Afghan insurgency has largely been a function of the extent to which the 
regime is viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the population. Critical here is the fact that since 
the time of the Achaemenids and the Parthians history has demonstrated that the legitimacy 
of Afghan governance is derived from two immutable sources: dynastic sources, usually in the 
 1 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007), 20.
 2 Unless otherwise speci!ed, the term “religious !gures of authority” extends to include the Taliban as well as other !gures who would not 
necessarily identify themselves as such or who work together with the government.
 3 Author’s interview with senior State Department and Department of Defense analysts and o%cials, Washington, D.C., March 2009. It 
should be noted, however, that there are many cases where a Taliban commander will adopt (or be given) the title “mullah”—still implicitly 
suggesting the importance of religious !gures in this insurgency/jihad.
 4 Traditionally mullahs have served as village spiritual advisors as well as elementary teachers and are paid by donations from the community, 
o$en supplementing their income through farming or a trade. Mullahs vary considerably by educational background from being illiterate to 
having some madrassah (Islamic school) education. 
 5 For a discussion of Taliban narratives, see "omas H. Johnson, “"e Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 317–44. 
 6 On “accidental guerrillas,” see David Kilcullen, !e Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). Kilcullen argues that an accidental guerrilla is an individual motivated to !ght due to an encroachment on the local 
social network or way of life. 
 7 Some observers argue that the social changes made during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan war are what gave power to religious leaders and 
village mullahs. See, for example, "omas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 70. It is also important to note that millions of Afghan refugees settled 
in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad and were indoctrinated by Islamist mullahs in these camps. Many of these refugees eventually 
returned to Afghanistan as committed Islamists. 
 8 See generally, Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
 9 David Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1–32.
 10 William Maley, “Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban,” in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998), 8. Until the rise of the Taliban mullahs, overt religious !gures never held political power nationally 
in Afghanistan.
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form of monarchies and tribal patriarchies, and religious sources.11 "is problem of legitimacy 
is especially acute at the local and village level of rural Pashtun society, for whom dynastic and 
religious authority has been paramount for over a thousand years.12 
"e objective of this essay is to brie&y address issues of Islam, politics, and the dynamics of 
religious authority in southern Afghanistan—the traditional spiritual center of the country 
and a signi!cant focus of Taliban insurgent activity.13 In doing so, this essay will examine the 
following topics: the cultural and religious mores and tropes of Loy Kandahar, the ulema shura14 
of southern Afghanistan, the role that the Afghan media plays in legitimizing !gures of religious 
authority and how certain religious !gures manipulate this media attention, the Taliban’s strategic 
use of symbols and the media to gain legitimacy, and the Tablighi Jamaat and Su!s in southern 
Afghanistan. "ese extremely complex topics will be addressed using anecdotal experience and 
evidence, interviews conducted in the region over the last few years, and other data gathered, in 
part, in greater southern Afghanistan. 
"e fundamental question that this paper seeks to address is that of Islam’s public persona: 
who speaks for Islam in Afghanistan? "e extent of the historical and cultural tradition of these 
religious !gures’ political involvement is then examined, for where there is religious in&uence there 
is also bound to be some element of power play. Subsidiary questions look into what the sources of 
these religious !gures’ in&uence are, how these sources are changing, and what the fundamental 
factors of this in&uence are—i.e. the base societal conditions in southern Afghanistan and how 
they shape the way religious !gures can operate.
Southern Afghanistan is an interesting case study in part because so little has been written on 
the exact dynamics of the interaction between religion and politics, even for a group as prominent 
as the Taliban. "e area of “greater Kandahar” remains the spiritual and strategic heart of the 
present con&ict, and as such an increased understanding of the religious dimension can help 
prevent mistakes borne of ignorance and impoverished assumptions. "ere is no doubt that 
religious !gures have, are, and will continue to play a central role in militant mobilizations in 
Afghanistan. Understanding such mobilizations is ultimately the goal of this essay.
Cultural and Religious In"uences in Southern Afghanistan
Nearly all Afghans are Muslim, with Islam serving as a common frame of reference and key 
cognitive driver for the vast majority of the population. Undoubtedly, Islam is the only characteristic 
that nearly all Afghans have in common. Yet popular Islamic ideas and beliefs are rooted in a 
mix of culture, self-interpreted religious views, tribal values, money, in&uence, and personal 
connections. Although religion has clearly helped to shape Afghan values systems and codes of 
behavior for generations, it would nevertheless be wrong to infer that this fact results in unanimity 
of opinion concerning all things Muslim. Islam is not a monolithic entity in Afghanistan just as 
 11 On Afghan governance during this period, see Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
 12 See "omas H. Johnson and W. Chris Mason, “Re!ghting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,” Military Review 
(November–December 2009): 4–5; and Dupree, Afghanistan. For an excellent review of political legitimacy in Afghanistan, see "omas 
Bar!eld, “Problems of Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies 37 (2004): 263–69; and "omas Bar!eld, Afghanistan: A 
Cultural and Political History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics) (forthcoming, 2010). 
 13 It is important to note that the terms “Taliban” and “Talib” are not used here as a blanket term for anyone opposed to the Afghan 
government but rather as a term meaning religious students educated in madaris (Islamic schools, plural of madrasah).
 14 Ulema is a collective term for doctors of Islamic sciences and graduates of Islamic studies or private studies with an alim (one who possesses 
the quality of lim or knowledge of Islamic law, theology, and traditions). A shura is a council or consultative body.
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Christianity is not a monolithic entity in the United States or Europe. Afghan Islam encompasses 
a wide range of opinions—including reformists, foreign-educated progressives, ascetics, radicals, 
Sala!sts, Deobandis, Talibs, and conservative judicial scholars, among others. All of these can be 
pro-government or anti-government (and sometimes both), West-loving or West-hating; there is 
no uniformity of opinion. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that all southern political, 
economic, and social behavior is driven merely by religious dynamics. A variety of intervening 
variables such as the urban-rural divide, geography, culture, and quams15 and a%nity groups are 
also important in&uences that must be recognized.16 "ese intervening variables of in&uence will 
be the next topic of assessment and discussion. 
Rural Population Distribution 
"e most important and relevant division within southern Afghan society, the divide between 
urban and rural populations, is o$en glossed over by Western analysts. Cleavages between the 
urban and rural populations of Loy (Greater) Kandahar17 have long been a driving force of southern 
politics, social interactions, and con&icts as well as aspects of Islamic practice. 
Population statistics dating back to 2004 (the best and most recent data available) demonstrate 
that only 12% of southern Afghans belong to urban communities in Loy Kandahar; rural society 
makes up 88% of the population (see Figure 1). When you look outside Kandahar Province, the 
!gures become even starker with only 5%, 2%, and 4% for the residents of Helmand, Uruzgan, and 
Zabul provinces respectively living in urban environments. "e south is primarily a rural environ 
and this fact is important when we consider the role religious !gures play in southern Afghanistan. 
"ere is no question that urban and rural Afghanistan have distinct cultures.18 "ese cultures in 
turn play a signi!cant role in determining how a particular person or group of people will behave 
and respond to certain types of authority !gures—be they religious or political, or conservative, 
moderate, or radical.
Attempts to modernize the south (and the never-ending con&ict between the traditional and the 
modern) are central concerns of the area’s ideological battleground. Attempts to institute modern 
political or social agendas have not necessarily been met with enthusiasm in Loy Kandahar. 
Consider, for example, how the south responded to the recent “democratic” elections held in 
Afghanistan. While the vast majority of Afghan provinces had registered voter turnout rates 
for the 2005 provincial elections of 60%–70%, the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, 
and Zabul had rates of 25.3%, 36.8%, 23.4%, and 20% respectively.19 Interviews conducted this 
past summer among village elders and leaders in Kandahari districts suggest that there was little 
interest in the 2009 presidential election or local provincial and district elections in the south.20 
In fact, it was further posited during these interviews that the Taliban were not overly interested 
in attempting to disrupt these elections because of the apparent apathy of the Kandaharis toward 
 15 Quams refers to a communal group whose sociological basis may vary; it may be a clan—in tribal zones—a village, an ethnic group, an 
extended family, or a professional group.
 16 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 242. 
 17 Loy Kandahar refers to the geographical area encompassing Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces. 
 18 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 10–29.
 19 Sean M. Maloney, “A Violent Impediment: "e Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province 2003–07,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 205.















F I G U R E  1  Population distribution in Southern Afghanistan
S O U R C E  Afghanistan Central Statistics O%ce, 2004.
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them.21 "ough the day of what would ultimately turn out to be a blatantly corrupt election did 
see a spike in insurgent activities, it was not as intense as the Americans or International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) expected.
"e village continues to be a pivotal and de!ning institution of life in southern Afghanistan, 
and many villagers view Kandahar City with suspicion and disdain. For a society that—at least on 
one level—is as traditional as Afghanistan, the concern of much of the southern rural population 
is that Kandahar City is a source of corruption and iniquity. Indeed, the Taliban regularly play 
on this belief and consider the city as the area where in!dels live. Further, the Taliban use this 
justi!cation to legitimize their attacks in the city.22 
Geography
"e e#ect of Afghanistan’s geography is o$en underestimated as a factor that in&uences social 
behavior. In southern Afghanistan, the distances involved, high levels of insecurity, and the 
sometimes di%cult terrain between villages have helped give rise to the “one-family-one-mosque” 
phenomenon, which is discussed below. In addition, isolated and fairly inaccessible locations are 
prevalent in the south, helping to create a culture of “traveling mullahs” who satisfy the need for 
!gures of authority—sometimes simply to mediate local disputes. Many of these mullahs also 
 21 Personal interviews with district and village elders, Kandahar City, May–June 2009.
 22 Personal interview with Kandahari citizen, Kandahar City, September 2008. "is same interviewee told the story of a friend who was 
apprehended by Taliban. "is person told his abductors that he was a nurse—not a government employee or o%cial—and served all people. 
"e Taliban replied that they had “permission” and a duty to kill all “Muslim in!dels” (but not their women and children) who live in 
Kandahar City. 
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help to solidify the Taliban narrative through preaching and, indeed, encouraging and prompting 
individuals to join the insurgency against Kabul and the “in!dels.” 
"e geography of irrigated lands of southern Afghanistan especially around Kandahar City 
has also played a role in de!ning certain social norms and in&uences. As "omas Bar!eld has 
suggested “these rich irrigated lands…[supported] a hierarchical political system that required 
large agricultural surpluses to sustain them. It supported an elite of landowners whose tribal 
followers had in many cases been reduced to their economic clients.”23 "is factor has signi!cantly 
in&uenced the agrarian economy of southern Afghanistan as well as the development of important 
landowner families in the politics and social structure of the region, such as the Durrani 
Mohammadzais and Popalzais.
Kandahar’s typography also in&uences the security situation in the province. "e southern 
half of Kandahar is dominated by sparsely inhabited deserts and a porous border with Pakistan, 
accented by the large border-crossing at Spin Boldak, where both licit and illicit goods transit 
through every day. "e northern portion of Kandahar consists of wadis (dry riverbeds) and hilly 
terrain and lacks reliable roadways, making the region ideal for guerilla activity and the use of 
improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, the rocky, inhospitable terrain of western Uruzgan 
Province, which borders northern Kandahar, has provided a necessary refuge for the training, 
resting, and cycling of Taliban foot soldiers into the southern Afghanistan provinces. 
Pashtun Society and Culture
Pashtun society and culture is the dominant in&uence in southern Afghanistan, not least because 
Pashtuns make up the vast majority of the population and because the south has been historically 
the heartland of Pashtun in&uence in Afghanistan as a whole. Exact demographic statistics are 
impossible to come by, and the last accurate census was conducted decades ago, but it is safe to 
assume that at least 85% of the population in southern Afghanistan is ethnically Pashtun.
At the expense of overgeneralizing, Pashtuns tend to be pragmatic individuals who usually 
come to recognize early in their lives the core importance of their religion and relations with 
religious authorities.24 Village mullahs, whose role in rural communities has evolved over the 
centuries, are complemented by religious !gures such as sayyeds. "e family lineage of sayyeds is 
traced to the lineage of the Prophet, qazis, or religious law experts/shariah judges—either mawlawi, 
who teach at a higher level in religious schools (madaris) or pirs, who teach at Su! madaris or at 
collective prayer sites where Su!s congregate.
Depending on a particular situation, people will be more or less tempered by their interactions 
with and the roles of local religious !gures, resulting in one of the reasons that the religious make-
up and identity of many southern Pashtuns is so di%cult to de!ne. For a traditional religious 
elder—a mullah or mawlawi, for instance—mediation and con&ict resolution is an essential part 
of his mandate and identity, but this role also forms part of the basis of that same identity and 
authority. Both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan as well as in the border areas, religious elders 
have played this role since the early nineteenth century. Sana Haroon, for example, explores the 
little-understood traditional role of the rural mullah as the Pashtun equivalent of the circuit-
riding judge in nineteenth century America, serving as an impartial arbiter of disputes between 
 23 "omas J. Bar!eld, “Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organizations for Times of 
War and Peace” (paper presented as part of the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series entitled “Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: 
Transactions and Identities,” Yale University, New Haven, February 2007), 3.
 24 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 70–97. 
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clans (khels).25 Even in a jirga (a village council that has legislative and judicial authority for the 
tribal community) the authority of the elder mullah in convoking religious legitimacy over the 
proceedings is greater than many appreciate, especially in the form of mediation. "e implications 
of this authority for the present insurgency in Afghanistan are signi!cant, and the Taliban are well 
aware of this and use it to their advantage.26 Nevertheless, in deference to the implicit implications 
of the role of the rural mullah, religious authority only extends as far as the people let it. "e idea 
of near-total subservience to !gures of religious authority has little basis in fact in Afghanistan. 
A good example of this that is little understood in the West is the obscure phenomenon of “one-
family-one-mosque” that is especially prominent in southern rural areas. 
Family Culture
Loy Kandahari villages will o$en consist entirely of members of a single extended family 
(kahol) or clan (khel). Where di#erent families or groups coexist in one area, there will o$en be 
one mosque for each of the individual families. "ough particularly prominent in the south, this 
has been observed in communities from Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan to Farah Province 
in the southwest.27 
Although this phenomenon is also witnessed in the Afghan environs of rich or wealthy 
landowners who are known to construct mosques to help improve their public standing, one would 
expect it to be rarer in poverty-stricken rural areas. "e one-mosque-one-family concept promotes 
religious dynamics that are highly personal and relatively immune to rhetoric and manipulation 
by outside forces, and it is o$en di%cult for mass movements and popular uprisings to signi!cantly 
penetrate these mosques. For example, a prominent family will not only be responsible for physically 
building the mosque but also for the selection of the mosque’s mullah. During a recent research 
trip in southern Afghanistan, the author inquired to a prominent landowner, who had built a new 
mosque for his family in the village of Deh-e Bagh in the Dand District of Kandahar Province, as 
to what would happen if the mullah of the mosque started preaching in a way inconsistent with 
his family’s beliefs or political orientations. "e elder responded that “this would never happen 
because I hired the mullah and I would !re him if such preaching occurred. He works for me and 
will follow my instructions concerning such matters.” 
While the one-family-one-mosque concept has a tendency to insulate people from certain 
aspects of political Islam, the concept of jihad has the opposite e#ect.28 Historically, the connection 
between Islam and jihad has been extremely important for Kandahar with disenfranchised Afghans 
responding to the unifying call of jihad as a reaction to perceived corruption, government failure, 
and outside interference.29 In fact, jihad has traditionally represented a kind of public sphere of 
Kandahari Islam, where religious authority !gures can command more immediate support and 
obedience of the public. "e call of “Islam under threat” is an extremely powerful incentive 
for public and communal action and historically has been a consistent motivator and force for 
Kandaharis to stand behind.
 25 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2007).
 26 "e author is indebted to M. Chris Mason for bringing this interesting point to his attention.
 27 Based on the author’s discussions with and empirical observations of Conrad Jennings. "e author also observed this phenomena !rst-hand 
in villages in Kandahar’s Dand District in June 2009.
 28 It seems reasonable to assume that “privatizing” mosques signi!cantly dampens the collective Islam, where the mosque serves as the meeting 
place for social events or for the rallying of its members to combat an injustice or perceived threat. See Roy, Islam and Resistance, 31.
 29 See Barbara D. Metcalf, “‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council, http://essays.
ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm, 1–8. 
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Everyday Islamic Traditions
Islam, of course, is not just about following rules. "e core of Islam—as with most religions—is 
the provision of principles for living a moral life, and the regular daily cycle of prayers can remind 
the faithful of these values. It is for this reason that Kandaharis will o$en make reference to the 
idea of living a more moral life, even if they do not necessarily always follow it to its conclusion. A 
sampling of the key dimensions of southern Afghanistan’s Islamic traditions is presented below. 
Namaz. Islam a#ects the everyday life of a southern Afghan in a variety of ways. "e !ve daily 
prayers, namaz,30 for the most part, are integrated into the rhythm of the Afghan day. It is not seen 
as an interruption to stop what one is doing to pray. A corollary example of this is the use of a patu 
(patkai) on which to pray. A woolen blanket used during the day (especially during the winter) as 
a wrap-around cloak is taken o#, put on the &oor, and prayers are made there. "e patu is a good 
indication and re&ective of the e#ortless ubiquity of Islam in the daily life of Afghans.
Zakat. Another Islamic concept that demands mention is zakat (alms for the poor). Zakat 
is followed and o$en employed by the Taliban as a motivating force to encourage villagers to 
contribute funds or assets to their cause. 
Sharia courts. Yet another extremely important dynamic are sharia (Islamic law) courts that 
represent a popular alternative to government legal institutions, which have been marred by years 
of corruption and ine%cient legal processes. In numerous areas, especially in the rural southern 
Pashtun hinterlands, the Taliban are perceived as not only doing a better job of governance—
via “shadow” provincial and district governments—and providing justice than Kabul; the 
Taliban are also seen as more legitimate than the distant and unpopular leadership in Kabul.31 
"roughout southern Afghanistan, the Taliban have established parallel government systems 
including provincial and district level administrators, police chiefs, and judges; just how e#ective 
or widespread these informal power structures are is di%cult to assess.32 But one element of the 
Taliban’s shadow government that has been particularly popular throughout Loy Kandahar is 
the alternative judicial system. Today, faced with a choice between a protracted case before an 
inscrutable system of state justice, in which he who can pay the highest bribes to the most people 
over the longest period of time invariably wins, the Pashtuns are instead turning in droves to the 
rapid, transparent justice of the mullahs of the Taliban. Justice and, particularly, mediation are 
indeed a traditional part of the mullahs’ role in the community and the Taliban have masterfully 
played on this reality.33
Madrasah. "e institution of the madrasah, too, is an important feature of the day-to-day 
landscape of southern Afghanistan. "e role that madaris have played in the political life of 
southern Afghanistan has &uctuated over the years and, since the 1980s, permanently changed in 
character—endowing the religious clergy with political power and in&uence. "is culminated in 
the “clerical revolution” (with popular backing) of the Taliban in 1994. According to Olivier Roy, 
 30 At dawn (fajr), at noon (dhuhr), in the a$ernoon (asr), at sunset (maghrib), and at nightfall (ishaa).
 31 "is was a common theme among the 60 or so village elders, tribal leaders, and even some Afghan government leaders interviewed by the 
author in various locations in Afghanistan, August–September, 2008 and May–June 2009. It is important to note, however, that the desire of 
locals for Taliban court systems because of corruption and ine%ciency of the government’s system. In rural communities most of the legal 
matters relating to land and crime would never have been legislated by the government (even in the 1970s) and as such that people go to 
the Taliban courts is not so surprising. For a recent discussion of the Taliban court systems, see “Afghanistan: In Search of Justice,” National 
Public Radio, webpage, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98121740.
 32 “Taliban Shadow Gov’t Pervades Afghanistan,” CBS News, December 27, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/27/world/
main4687823_page2.shtml.
 33 For an important scholarly statement and analysis of the impact of culture on Afghan law, see "omas Bar!eld, “Culture and Custom in 
Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan,” Maine Law Review 60, no. 2 (2008): 358–73.
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the Afghan Taliban is the only contemporary Islamic movement whose basis is a network of rural 
madaris, e#ectively tapping the well of rural southern Afghan conservatism and puritanism.34 "e 
full history of this change is beyond the scope of this short essay, but the profound e#ect this had 
on communities should not be underestimated.
Jihad and a History of Con!ict
As suggested above, jihad is another important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. 
In many respects waging jihad has become a cornerstone of Islamic identity for many southern 
Afghans, as they have assumed the struggle for the predominance of God’s will, both within oneself 
and between other people. "ough this will be explored more fully in later sections of this paper, it 
is very important to understand that a large number of southern insurgents are !ghting in support 
of jihad and the implementation of sharia among other religious and ideological positions.
In contrast with the sheer numbers who volunteered for jihad in the 1980s, however, the 
calls of mullah networks are perhaps a less important in&uence in the present con&ict than the 
chronic unemployment and social stagnation as of 2009. In the 1980s social structures were more 
active and in&uential, creating a framework for recruitment. And while this is not necessarily the 
case today, it would nevertheless be imprudent to discount the importance of jihad in southern 
religious life. "is is especially true when assessing the motivations of the local as well as regional 
leaders of the Taliban.
"ere are a variety of other factors that in&uence the politics and relations of Afghans in 
the south. Con&ict itself is an important factor that since the early 1970s has had a preeminent 
in&uence on southern society. Over 30 years of con&ict have given the people of the south a 
somewhat unpredictable nature—in part stemming from a desire for self-preservation—that 
sometimes can work in opposition to core cultural and societal values of Islam or Pashtunwali 
(the unwritten Pashtun tribal code). In the wartime atmosphere of Kandahar, Helmand, or Zabul, 
there is a strong feeling of polarization, that others “are either with us or against us.” "is applies 
across the spectrum of the population’s relations with the government, tribal elders, businessmen, 
and the Taliban, as well as to the foreign forces operating in the south.35
One of the very signi!cant consequences of the Afghan’s anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and 
1980s was the destruction of the Pashtun temporal maliks36 and khans and their replacement by 
Islamist mullahs as power brokers. "is became even more important when Pakistan helped push 
the Taliban into Afghanistan in the 1990s.37 Pakistan purposefully deconstructed the traditional 
tribal order in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in an e#ort to promote 
radical Islamist mullahs who could recruit for the Afghan mujahideen in their con&ict against 
the Soviet occupiers.38 
 34 Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn, 204. 
 35 Personal interviews with district and village elders, Kandahar City, May–June 2009.
 36 "e British !rst introduced the maliki system, which Pakistan retained. "is system was aimed at creating reliable local elite whose loyalty 
could be rewarded by the state through special status, !nancial bene!ts, and o%cial recognition of in&uence over the tribes. It was intended 
to provide a single spokesman for a khel with whom the British administration could deal in an attempt to replicate the Sandeman system 
among the egalitarian Pashtun.
 37 Ahmed Rashid delves into the evolution of Pakistan’s support for radical Islamists and the Taliban as part of a comprehensive Afghan strategy. 
See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2001), 183–89. 
 38 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: !e Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2005), 67.
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Political and Economic Elites 
Islam should not be seen as the only in&uence on the lives of southern Afghans. In Kandahar 
City the top class of businessmen or political leadership are not necessarily the most principled 
group, nor are they especially religious. Money, narcotics, and in&uence are important factors for 
this group, and religion has a more limited impact on their lives as compared to other segments of 
society. In fact, to understand Kandahari society one needs to understand the three secular layers 
of in&uence in Kandahar: family, khel, and tribal interests; licit business relationships; and illicit 
business relationships. For example, today Kandahari political, economic, and social dynamics 
cannot be fully understood without considering the tribal relations and competitions between, for 
example, the Popolzai, Barakzai, Noorzai, Alikozai, and Achakzai tribal entities and respective 
leaders such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, Mohammad Shah, Amir Lalai, Gul Agha Sherzai, Khalid 
Pashtun, Tor Jan, Aref Noorzai, Haji Safullah, Haji Mirwais Noorzai, Karimullah Naqib, Haji 
Agha Lalai Dastageri, Khan Mohammad, Talih Agha Karimullah, Haji Kareem Khan, and Abdul 
Razziq. In addition, the explicit business enterprises of leading Kandahari powerbrokers such as 
Ahmed Wali Karzai and Razia Agha Sherzai, as well as his brother Gul Agha Sherzai, who is a 
former governor of Kandahar and powerbroker extraordinaire, and their patrons are of similar 
importance. Finally, the milieu of contracts emanating from the ISAF’s presence in southern 
Afghanistan and who gets what from whom are critical in mapping the Kandahari power elite. 
"ese political and !nancial elites of course do not hesitate to seem more or less religious as 
the situation demands. Religious !gures thus may not have speci!c temporal power; however, they 
o$en prove instrumental in certain transactions that would otherwise be problematic.
Religion and Authority in Southern Afghanistan
[We should regard] as political all actors and activities involved in the 
establishment, maintenance or contestation of particular visions of public 
morality (“the good”) and of social order.39
Both mullahs and formally trained Islamic legal scholars, alim (singular of ulema), are 
signi!cant and in&uential religious !gures in southern Afghanistan. While village mullahs have 
ideally studied Islamic traditions (hadith) and Islamic law ("qh), their actual formal education will 
vary from basically none to signi!cant madrasah training. All mullahs, however, will lead mosque 
prayer sessions and conduct religious rituals such as birth rites, marriage, and funeral services at 
the village level. "ey are basically “ritual practitioners,” in the words of Oliver Roy.40 
Mullahs have traditionally served as spiritual advisors to village elders, jurgas, and shuras and, 
for the most part, have been inconsequential to village politics. It has also been suggested that 
mullahs serve as the custodians of the principals of pashtunwali and “use their religious authority 
to pass binding judgments rooted in [pashtunwali] in the area of the tribal jirga.”41 "is is an 
important social dynamic in southern Pashtun Afghanistan. 
 39 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 6.
 40 Olivier Roy, !e Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 28.
 41 Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 68.
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Historically the vast majority of mullahs have rarely been militant. A mullah’s basic legitimacy 
customarily has come from his application of sharia and defense of the Islamic community.42 "e 
role of the mullah has changed drastically with the rise of the Taliban, however. "ough they were 
once primarily apolitical, serving the role of a glori!ed notary public, mullahs are now the leading 
political and ideological !gures and voices of the Afghan insurgency. "e present role of many 
mullahs in providing narratives and information to the village population has become a critical 
source of their in&uence and is the subject of the next section of this paper.
The Roles and Authority of Mullahs in Southern Afghanistan
Who controls the &ow of information is vitally important in southern Afghanistan, and the 
control of religious information is intimately in&uenced by language and the relative lack of 
education realized in the southern Pashtun areas. Most of the population does not understand 
Arabic. "is results in the Muslim faithful being almost entirely dependent on the local mullah to 
teach and interpret the words and lessons of the Koran. In many instances, especially in the rural 
southern hinterland, the mullah himself has no in-depth knowledge of Arabic and thus will rely 
on local traditions and oral narratives in his religious teachings and lessons. "is interpretive duty 
results in considerable power for the mullahs. 
"e control of information also has an impact on the role of religious !gures as mediators; they 
are seen as being both impartial and possessing a broader perspective as well as possessing pertinent 
legal expertise that allows them to pass judgment on certain issues. For example, the institution 
of the “Friday sermon,” a speech to the gathered faithful, which o$en touches on political issues 
(remember that there is considerably less distinction between politics and religion when compared 
with much Western religious thought). In many respects this sermon is an extension of their 
authority. Mullahs now regularly pass judgment on local political or governmental personalities as 
well as critique political and social situations. 
Mullahs gain some of this authority through the receipt of foreign aid, much in the form of zakat, 
particularly from Middle Eastern and South Asian sources. Some of this aid, distributed through 
mosques, is most certainly aimed at strengthening the authority of the religious !gures. Mullahs have 
become a focal point of resource distribution, and as such their authority has been strengthened.
Ulema Council
!is religious interpretation of the rebellion was promoted by the ulema and 
the mullahs, a group strongly united in their struggle against the communist 
authorities, who had proclaimed a jihad against the regime. Represented 
everywhere in the country, they constituted an informal but e$cient network 
for the transmission of information, as the rebellion of 1929 had already 
shown. In instances where the uprising was coordinated, for example in Logar 
[sic] or in Ghazni, the ulema played the leading role. In most insurrections 
the sermons of the mullahs were crucial: the people o%en assembled at the 
mosque before marching on the government command post. In the mosques, 
the habitual scene for discussion among the villagers, the mullah would use his 
in&uence to put forward a religious exegesis of resistance to authority, and his 
intervention o%en served to convince the hesitant by removing their doubts as 
 42 Roy, !e Failure of Political Islam, 3, 29.
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to the illegitimacy of the authorities….With the proclamation of jihad by the 
ulema the rebellion took on a universal nature.43
"e social and political role of mullahs and ulema has been crucial throughout the past 40 years 
of Afghan history. Looking back even further to the past two centuries, and including the Pakistani 
border areas, a trend of increased in&uence is evident, legitimized by a wide variety of dynamics. 
In Kandahar, mullah networks and the ulema council44 operate side by side as of 2009, but broadly 
speaking they are ideologically opposed to each other. "e legitimacy of both these groups is drawn 
from a variety of sources, but three factors are worth considering here: tribes, age, and wealth.
Regardless of what members of ulema may say in interviews, the tribe that someone comes 
from is an important factor in the level of respect for that person—even before graduating from a 
madrasah.45 Similarly, age is important only in that it takes time for an alim to mature as a !gure 
and gain respect in society. Shia ulema tend to be younger, and a younger, more active member of 
the Shia clergy can advance and make a name for himself—within reason. It is doubtful, however, 
that Afghanistan, outside of the Hazarajat, will ever be fertile ground for the Shia.46 "us, ulema in 
Afghanistan tend to be older members of society.
Wealth—of paramount importance to the non-religious or tribal oligarchy—is relatively 
unimportant for the ulema and mullah network. Popular opinion, as well as a whole host of folklore 
and proverbs, considers mullahs as de facto poor. "e image of the mullah asking for money from 
the rich man is a common stereotype in Kandahari society. In many respects, however, this is a 
self-created narrative. In fact, grants of land and !nancial contributions to the mosques, and the 
establishment of madaris connected to the mosques, have served to make the mullahs among the 
wealthiest men in some rural areas in terms of total assets.47
In Kandahar, aside from the signi!cant role that the religious clergy took post-1994, there was 
no ulema council in the form that currently exists. "e traditional role of the religious clergy was 
to assist in religious administrative duties (all the traditional aspects that we commonly associate 
with the clergy), to serve as part of the Haj and Awqaf ministry, and to serve in the Ministry of 
Justice. "e ulema council in the south (with Kandahar as the focal point) represents a sector of 
the religious clergy that has remained relatively unradicalized by war. For example, consider Haji 
Mahmoud (originally from the Khakrez District of Kandahar Province).48 He is a writer, poet, and 
member of the ulema council and views his role as being quite simple: encouraging those who wish 
for a continuation of the con&ict to start interacting with society in a more peaceful manner.49
Members of the ulema council claim a salary of around $200 each month. Aside from their 
general duties, one of their main activities seems to be producing a government-funded magazine—
Islami Diwa—each month. "e current head of Kandahar’s ulema council is Mawlawi Sayyed 
Mohammad Hana! (Alizai by tribe and originally from Helmand Province). He was selected and 
 43 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 106–7.
 44 See the appendix for the text of the Ulema Shura Declaration, Kabul, March 19, 2009. One of the author’s interviewees suggested that a 
number of the members in the ulema council were only elders. Author’s interview, Kandahar City, September 2008.
 45 Based on numerous personal interviews, Kandahar City, August and September 2008.
 46 "is is not to suggest that Shia do not exist in the south. "ere are important pockets of Shia Pashtuns in the Loy Kandahar, but their 
societal and political importance is slight. 
 47 "e author is indebted to M. Chris Mason for this point.
 48 Haji Mahmoud served as a minister of parliament in Kabul during the reign of Zahir Shah.
 49 Interview of Haji Mahmoud by Conrad Jennings. 
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appointed to that position by Asadullah Khaled, the former governor of Kandahar—a fact that 
helps illustrate one aspect of the relatively unclear relationship between the Afghan government 
and the ulema in Kandahar.
"e council consists of approximately 60 or 70 clerics from within the city and 5 or 6 from every 
district in the province, leading to a total of 140 or 150 mullahs and mawlawis who participate 
in the council. Some of the clergy in the city occasionally o#er advice or counsel to the Afghan 
government (to the governor, for example), and there is even the possibility of outreach to Kabul 
via the central ulema council there and its head, Shinwari Saheb (Borhanullah Shinwari, former 
Afghan attorney general). "e council’s political “face” also extends as far as appearances in the 
local media: members write articles for newspapers and magazines, speak regularly on radio 
programs, and are quite frequently invited as guests onto local television stations.
Interactions of the Afghan domestic security apparatus—for example, Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS)—with the ulema in Kandahar are clouded in secrecy, and it is 
di%cult to determine the nature of explicit relationships with any degree of certainty. It is relatively 
clear though that government agencies are at the very least attempting to use the ulema as their 
eyes and ears in the districts. With tens of thousands of agents around the country, the ulema and 
mullah networks around the province would be a ripe resource for domestic security services, but 
it is highly likely that there are a signi!cant number of paid informants among the ulema. 
Some members of the religious clergy—certain prominent families within the city, for example—
use religious legitimacy as a way to enhance their personal status and business interests. "is can 
be purely an issue of status (for example, being called into advise the governor on a regular basis) 
or can be !nancial (i.e., receiving more contracts from foreign militaries for construction projects 
or private and convoy security duties). "ere is, however, very little contact between NATO/ISAF 
and the ulema of southern Afghanistan. In some ways, this is regrettable:
Lack of familiarity, not knowing how to engage, and political sensitivities 
in donor home countries can partly explain the lack of engagement from the 
side of the international community. Further, stereotyping of religious leaders 
and institutions as militant fundamentalists—o$en equated with the Taliban 
and radical madrasas—makes it di%cult politically to include religious actors 
and institutions as partners in civil society. Within the Afghan government 
and the international community, many seem to be having concerns about 
making religious actors more powerful by granting them formal authority and 
recognition.50
Assassinations and the Impact of Con!ict
Afghan ulema in southern Afghanistan have been targeted by members of the insurgency on 
a regular basis since 2001. Approximately 24 members of the o%cial ulema council have been 
killed since 2001, along with dozens of mullahs and other religious !gures, including Mawlawi 
Mohammad Rasoul (killed outside the Qadiri Mosque in Kandahar City), Qari Ahmadullah 
(killed in his home on March 1, 2009), Mawlawi Abdul Qayyum (shot outside the Red Mosque in 
Kandahar City), and most well-known Mawlawi Fayyaz, the !rst president of the ulema council 
 50 Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, and Kanishka Nawabi, “"e Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan: Case Studies 
from Sayedabad and Kunduz,” Cooperation for Peace and Unity, July 2007, 8, http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?!le=/afghanistan/doc/Kunduz%20
and%20Sayedabad%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.
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and son of Mawlawi Darab Akhundzada.51 Mawlawi Fayyaz famously stripped Mullah Omar of 
his legendary Amir ul-Mumineen (commander of the believers or faithful) status during a public 
sermon (although it is debatable whether Fayyaz actually had the religious authority to do so) 
and survived numerous attempts against his life before insurgent gunmen eventually succeeded 
in murdering him. 
Afghan ulema are probably targeted because they o#er a legitimate opposition to the radical 
mobilizations and motivations o#ered by the Taliban to young madrasah students and the 
unemployed. "is is not to suggest that the insurgency is only primarily motivated by ideology 
or religion. Many ulema council members are actively and deliberately provocative. "ey write 
articles, make pronouncements, and issue statements arguing, for example, that suicide bombing 
is an illegitimate form of jihad. 
It is important to recognize that Afghanistan, and especially southern Afghanistan, is a region 
where con&ict and war have been staples of daily life for over 30 years. "is changes a society. 
Money (and the resultant status it brings) becomes one of the most important assets—people 
have less opportunity to exercise the luxury of having principles. It is clear that Islam throughout 
Afghanistan is radicalized and further politicized by con&ict.52 "is has resulted in less room for 
nuance in argumentation or for an intellectually formulated opinion, and this ultimately works 
against the members of the ulema council. At the same time, con&ict also has a tendency to 
reinforce the need for !gures of authority like the mullahs within society.
Media and Religious Authority
While new arenas of religious discourse have certainly been created, this does 
not necessarily mean that the messages, values and norms communicated 
within these spaces are also new. It can be argued that in many cases traditional 
forms of authority and articulation work very well in new media spaces, and 
indeed, have used these spaces to reach out to an expanded audience base.53
Southern Afghanistan is commonly viewed as a provincial backwater, a place where new trends 
are rare and where ancient and !xed ideas hold sway. "e Taliban are supposedly a symptom 
of this alleged cultural and social malaise; frequently, however, the Taliban are portrayed as 
being the innovators and consumers of techniques and technologies of the mass media and 
communication.54 In fact, this apparent paradox does not exist outside Western analyses of 
structures of religious authority and their means of communication. "e religious clergy are 
probably the leading authority and experts on nuanced communications in southern Afghanistan. 
For example, the clergy utilizes locally e#ective media, from radio to print, to transmit culturally 
appropriate and resonant messages to a local audience. Likewise, the Taliban in general are 
extremely e#ective communicators and run a viable, in&uential information campaign through 
 51 Bashir Ahmad Nadem , “Religious Scholar Shot Dead in Kandahar,” Pajhwok Afghan News, January 6, 2009, http://www.pajhwok.com/
viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=67799; Bashir Ahmad Nazim, “Religious Scholar, Four Guards Killed in Kandahar,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 
March 1, 2009, http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=70485; and A. Jamali, “Taliban Forces Are Now Attacking Sunni 
Leaders in Afghanistan,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 2, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30481. 
 52 For general information about the in&uence of con&ict on Islam in Afghanistan, see Roy, Islam and Resistance. 
 53 Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 323.
 54 “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no. 158, July 24, 2008.
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the south of the country. Nothing that NATO or ISAF produces approaches this level of 
e#ectiveness or sophistication.55 "is e#ective use of the media in turn strengthens the authority 
of the communicator. As suggested above, information is one of the most important currencies in 
southern Afghanistan, and a prominent voice is crucial to establishing oneself as someone who 
possesses such information, which is exactly the reason why the ulema shura devotes so much 
time to communication work. "e Taliban rightly see the continuation of this work as threatening 
to the transmission of their messages and thus attempt to stop the work of the ulema through a 
strategy of assassinations.
"e use of media by religious !gures of authority is simultaneously targeted and di#use.56 
Television is one such method, with mullahs and mawlawis frequently being interviewed in the 
studio or via telephone and consulted as experts. "e Taliban manufacture DVDs and video 
clips suitable for viewing on mobile phones that are distributed to the target audience as well as 
to Afghan and foreign media outlets.57 "e author, for example, witnessed Taliban videos and 
musical propaganda being downloaded from one person’s cell phone to another through the use 
of Bluetooth technologies in Kandahar City in June 2009. Radio is employed to similar e#ect. 
Newspapers (or publications of a similar style with similar means of distribution) are published 
by most religious !gures of authority. Indeed, newspapers have traditionally been used by political 
parties and religiously inclined groupings to publically express their views; this practice continues 
to this day, in Kandahar, Kabul, and throughout the country. As suggested above, the ulema in 
Kandahar publish a monthly magazine.
"e Internet is also used by various groups, although with a higher variance of success. 
Websites in Afghanistan tend to be less sophisticated than those set up by religious groups in 
other countries, such as Pakistan and Iran. It is perhaps understandable that Afghanistan should 
be somewhat behind on this, but the form is not particularly important, as the target audience, 
for the most part, is not Afghan. "is is particularly true of the websites of the Afghan Taliban, 
which are not used as tools of radicalization for an Afghan target audience. Instead, these websites 
primarily target an international audience.
Asif Mohseni and Religious Media
"e former mujahedeen commander and highly respected Shia religious scholar Asif Mohseni 
(his name is usually pre!xed by either Ayatollah or Sheikh) is a good example of a highly engaged 
and sometimes pioneering member of Afghanistan’s religious clergy who is presently proactively 
in&uencing various segments of the Afghan population through the innovative use of religious 
media. It is instructive to identify and compare the strategies he employs “for Afghanistan’s future” 
with those employed to supposedly similar e#ect by the Taliban. "is case study is not cited with 
speci!c reference to southern Afghanistan but, rather, to compare and contrast the use of media 
 55 NATO has the technological capabilities but does not have the requisite linguistic and communicative expertise the Taliban have, which 
reaches more than just the urban areas. Although NATO can reach an urban audience, it has much more di%culty reaching the majority 
rural population, over which the Taliban have a virtual monopoly of in&uence.
 56 "e use of mass media by South Asian religious !gures is not a new phenomenon. Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 68, for example, describes how 
Pashtun religious !gures in what was then India (now the tribal areas of Pakistan) were impressed in the early years of the twentieth century 
by techniques employed by the Jamaat-i Mujahidin: “Association with the Jamaat-i Mujahidin also heightened the pro!le of the mullas 
who had hitherto never used sophisticated methods of self-projection like printing presses. Impressed by the methods…such as posting 
proclamations of jihad on trees through Mardan, the Haji Turangzai acquired his own printing press in 1916.” 
 57 "e methods the various groups employ o$en overlap. Media outlets nominally aligned with the Afghan government and the broad goals 
of the United States and international administration o$en rebroadcast these propaganda clips because they are not able to generate enough 
original content and are thus forced to dance to the Taliban’s tune.
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employed by the Taliban, and possibly to illustrate a model for a di#erent kind of engagement with 
!gures of religious authority. "at is, Mohseni’s vision of in&uence through the media o#ers an 
example that other religious !gures will probably emulate in the future.
"e 76-year old Mohseni, originally from Kandahar, led the Shia party Harakat-i-Islami during 
the 1980s against the Soviets, although he did not take a position in the mujahedeen government 
that formed in 1992 a$er the fall of Najibullah. He participated at the Bonn conference in 2001 and 
was a strong advocate for Shia interests to be re&ected in the Afghan constitution. Mohseni receives 
extensive funding directly from Iran, although the exact amounts are disputed. "is funding has 
been instrumental in the two projects that he has been busy with over the past two years—a new 
mega-madrasah in Kabul and a television station of his own entitled Tamadon (civilization).58 
Mohseni’s madrasah, reportedly built at a cost of at least $5 million and half-funded by Iran, 
is located in west Kabul and the campus would not look out of place in a considerably more 
technologically developed and modernized city such as Islamabad or Tehran:
It’s a sweeping co-ed campus, with lecture halls, science labs, and internet 
cafés. When the madrassa opens fully this year, the curriculum will consist of 
half Islamic study, half science, math and computer classes. "is is, Mohseini 
[sic] says with a certain gru#ness, “a radical break” from traditional syllabi.59
Tamadon, launched in 2007, was marketed as an Islamic television channel that could function 
in opposition to some of the more liberal stations operating out of Kabul (such as Tolo or Aina).
We are backward in all aspects. Economically, we are in the 16th or 17th 
century, but our televisions air ten times sexier !lms (than Western countries),” 
said Mohseini [sic]. “"is is a scandal and shame for us. We have a thousand 
calamities and should not be diverted,” Mohseini told Reuters.60
Tamadon is sta#ed by competent graduates of a training program partially conducted in 
Iran (either independently or on secondment to Iranian media outlets). With good equipment 
and training, Mohseni and his sta# are well on their way to achieving a level of in&uence across 
Afghanistan that would not otherwise have been possible. 
Prominent Islamic Groups and In"uences in Southern Afghanistan
Just as the distinctions between the religious and the political61 are blurred in Pashtun and 
Afghan culture, so do the spheres and !gures of authority frequently shi$ from the religious to 
the political (and back again). "ese dynamics are in&uenced by the respective experiences and 
historical roles that these !gures played during the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad and the ensuing civil 
war. Yet it is important to recognize that certain sectors of the population and in&uence groups 
prominent in other parts of the country were entirely absent in the major southern Afghan 
politico-religious debates of the past 30 years. For example, the Afghan Islamists of the 1970s 
 58 Nushin Arbabzadah, “Afghanistan’s Turbulent Cleric,” Guardian, April 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/18/
afghanistan-shia-law-women. Mohseni also spreads his messages through a program on the Afghan television channel Ariana, which is 
even accessible to (and popular with) Afghans living in the United States and the West.
 59 Jack Fairweather, “Modernizing Madrassas,” Washington Post, web log, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/
islamsadvance/2008/02/modernizing_madrassas.html.
 60 “Afghan Cleric Launching New TV Station,” Reuters, February 8, 2007, http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/afghan-cleric-launching-new-tv-station.
 61 For more on this distinction, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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and their ideological discussions at Kabul University62 (and later in Peshawar during the 1980s)—
Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ahmad Shah Massoud—
were not very important or in&uential for the Talibs of the south.63 Ultimately, many of these key 
players and parties of the anti-Soviet jihad had little in&uence in critical events of the region. It 
was the polarization of the parties along ethnic, tribal, and geographic lines that would eventually 
help shape the politics and narratives of the rest of the country.64
Deobandism
Deobandism is one of the principal Islamic philosophical in&uences in southern Afghanistan 
and a prominent force in Afghan political Islam. In theory, the Deobandi school of Islam shares 
many of the same beliefs as Su!sm65; however, the two schools are not in concert on the means 
of achieving their similar objectives to remove corruption and materialism from Islam. Whereas 
Su!sm was a reaction to conditions under the Umayyad Caliphate—the second of the four 
Islamic caliphates a$er the death of Mohammad—Deobandism arose as a reaction to the British 
colonialism in India. "e two key founders of Deobandism were Hazrat Maulana Mohammad 
Qasim Nanautavi and Hazrat Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi, who founded the Dar ul-
Ulum madrasah in Deoband, India, in the mid-nineteenth century that has shaped resistance 
tropes in the subcontinent ever since. "ere are thousands of Deoband madaris in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. A paradox between Deobandism and Su!sm is that many Deobandis are also 
members of Su! brotherhoods. 
"e teachings of Deobandism focus on strict adherence to Islamic ethical codes and the 
independence of Muslim lands. Attacks on Muslim lands are considered attacks on Islam and 
worthy of jihad.66 According to Deobandism, a Muslim’s !rst obligation is to his faith and then to 
his country. Yet Deobandism does not recognize national boundaries per se but rather holds the 
boundaries of the greater Islamic community (or ummah) paramount. Muslims have an obligation 
and duty to wage jihad in defense of Muslims anywhere they are threatened. 
Deobandism falls under the Hana! school of Sunni Islam and shares much in common with 
the teachings of many great Islamic reformers, such as Mawdudi in Pakistan, Sayyed Qutb in 
Egypt, and Ibn Taymiyyah, who all advocated Islamic statehood following the principles of sharia, 
though they di#ered on the means acceptable to bring this about.67 Deobandism does not focus on 
mysticism and asceticism in the way that Su!sm does but does encourage pious practice and is a 
major faith throughout South Asia. Rather than representing discrete and opposing religious world-
views, however, it is perhaps more accurate to say that these schools represent di#erent modalities 
for gaining and engaging religious knowledge: one more scriptural, the other more emotive. 
 62 Much of this movement owed its organization and ideology to the in&uence of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin) and 
had as its chief ideologues Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, Rabbani, Sayyid Musa Tawana, and others who studied at al-Azhar University in 
Cairo and later taught on the faculty of theology at Kabul University.
 63 Other anti-Soviet jihadi Peshawar party political leaders such as Yunus Khalis and Mohammad Nabi Mohammdi had considerable in&uence 
over the Taliban in the south, particularly in Kandahar, during this time period. Many of the Taliban core from Kandahar fought under the 
command of Nabi Mohammdi’s local factions, including Mullah Omar. Khalis even helped radical elements in the eastern Afghanistan rise 
to power, including Jalaluddin Haqqani who single handedly destroyed the Zadran’s malik system a$er he ran Mohammad Omar Babrakzai 
out of Paktia, the most powerful Zadran malik during the 1980s. Mohammadi’s faction helped spread the rise of madaris in southern 
Afghanistan and attracted many Talibs from Kandahar such as Mullah Omar. 
 64 For more on the polarization, see Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” 206. 
 65 “"e Deoband School drew heavily on the Su! tradition of Afghanistan and was highly orthodox in its interpretation of Islam.” Peter 
Marsden, Taliban: War, Religion, and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 1998), 79.
 66 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50–51.
 67 Ibid. 51.
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Deobandis are comfortable with Su!sm as expressed through pious and devotional practices but 
take issue with the social structure of Su!sm as manifested by the tariqat (brotherhoods).
"e Afghan constitution of 1931 guaranteed the right of the ulema to attend private religious 
schools, most of which were Deobandi, and until the Soviet invasion in 1979 the majority of the 
Afghan ulema were educated in these madaris.68
Tablighi Jamaat 
Faizani probably enjoyed his greatest support among military o$cers. He used 
the traditional Zikr circle as an avenue not just for spiritual enlightenment 
but also for political organizing. In tapping into the o$cer corps in this way, 
Faizani was following a longstanding tradition of Su" association with the 
military, a tradition that went back at least to the turn of the century and that 
had periodically generated considerable paranoia within the government.69
"e involvement of religious groups in political activities is probably one of the most 
misunderstood and yet crucial elements in recent Afghan history. In light of this, it is instructive 
to brie&y examine the activities of groups like the Tablighi Jamaat and Su!s. Secretive by nature, 
these groups represent large numbers of Afghans, yet they remain relatively less understood (and 
almost completely undocumented), and their role in Afghan society underappreciated. Part of the 
explanation for this relates to the urban-rural divide in Afghan society. Most of the members of 
Su! societies as well as the Tablighi Jamaat are rural and poor and not members of the urban 
elite.70 "is is an important reason why these groups are misunderstood by both outsiders and 
fellow Afghans.
Tablighi Jamaat was founded in the late 1920s by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi, 
himself a prominent member and advocate of the revivalist conservative Deoband tradition. 
Present members are committed to dawa or “the call.” Many of their activities are dedicated to 
persuading and proselytizing others to join them in either conversion, or simply just reforming and 
becoming a “proper Muslim.” To pursue this goal, the Tablighi Jamaat has established missionaries 
throughout the world.71
"e organization holds meetings throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan and has a proclivity 
for meeting in large regional centers. "e annual Lahore meeting seems to be the biggest in the 
two countries, with hundreds of thousands of attendees. At these events the discussion revolves 
around religious subjects, with members of the Tablighi Jamaat projecting an avowedly apolitical 
stance, refusing even to talk about the situation in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. At a meeting 
in Kabul, however, a colleague witnessed a full lineup of almost every single signi!cant mid-level 
mujahedeen commander from Nangarhar Province sitting in a circle together and discussing 
di#erent interpretations of a certain hadith.72 So although politics is apparently absent from 
 68 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50.
 69 David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 230. 
 70 Much of the Afghan urban elite identify with the more ideologically purist Hizb-e Islami.
 71 For an introduction to the Tablighi Jamaat and some of the suspicion this group has generated in the West, see Susan Sachs, “A Muslim 
Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.,” New York Times, July 14, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/14/national/14ISLA.
html?pagewanted=1.
 72 Observation of Conrad Jennings, summer 2007.
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the surface of such meetings, there is—in Afghanistan at least—some amount of networking 
happening at Tablighi Jamaat meetings and events.
"e Tablighi Jamaat’s explicit relationship with members of the insurgency is distant and 
seemingly detached, and despite certain ideological similarities by virtue of their shared idolization 
of the culture of the village, there are no strong ties with the Taliban. A number of Kandaharis 
have suggested to the author that they do not like the Tablighi because “many come from Pakistan” 
or because they are not Kandahari and they project themselves as knowing Islam better than 
Kandaharis do. In fact, it was suggested that Tablighi were not welcomed in local mosques and had 
been even asked to leave.73 Some Western scholars have argued that the Tablighi Jamaat networks 
are used by al Qaeda to radicalize vulnerable sectors of society,74 and U.S., British, Pakistani, and 
Afghan governments have monitored these networks closely.75 
Su"s
"e role of Su!sm (Islamic mysticism, tasawwuf) in Afghanistan is similarly misunderstood.76 
"e so-called mystical side of Islam, Su!sm, focuses on the personal relationship between the 
believer and God, with the believer seeking to individualize that connection through prayer, 
training, and discipline (marifa). "e modalities of the transmission of religious knowledge and 
the nature of the piri-muridi (master-student relationship) tradition in Su!sm are little understood 
but seemingly have important implications for the Afghan insurgency. Mullah-led militant 
mobilizations connected closely to Pashtun cultural mores and fraternity have a long history on 
the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. "e piri-murdi system represents a basic reformist ideology and a 
mode of knowledge transmission where a teacher is inherent in the knowledge. "us, mullahs who 
learn from the same teacher, or from teachers who had a common master, share the same ideology. 
"is system has served as a kind of social institution and network that past jihadist movements in 
South Asia, such as the Hindustani fanatics Akhund Gha#ur, Mullah Najmuddin of Hadda, and 
the Faqir of Ipi, have exploited.77
"e Su! mullahs and their murids (committed) and talibs operate a complex and mutually 
supportive network of insurgent religious authority. "eir information operations—carried out 
through mosque, madrasah, and langarkhana (a place where food is prepared and distributed to 
the poor) via pedagogy78—have, as suggested above, underpinned past insurgencies and jihads 
and presumably have helped to frame the discourse of the present Taliban jihad and insurgency. 
An understanding of this process is a vital starting point for any campaign to combat it.
Su!sm and the majority of Afghan ulema look at Islam from two di#erent perspectives. "e 
ulema focus primarily on the orderly interpretation of Islamic law and doctrine, whereas the Su!s 
focus on the love of God through asceticism and ritual practice.79 "is division in the interpretation 
 73 Personal interviews, Kandahar City, August 2008.
 74 John Walker Lindh of “American Taliban” fame was allegedly indoctrinated by Tablighi Jamaat before joining the Afghan Taliban. "e UK 
cricket team coach murdered by assassins is thought to have been killed by Tablighi Jamaat operatives.
 75 Paul Lewis, “Inside the Islamic Group Accused by MI5 and FBI,” Guardian, August 19, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/
aug/19/religion.terrorism.
 76 For overviews of Su! history and philosophy, see Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Su"sm (New York: New York University 
Press, 1989); Annnemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); and J. Spencer 
Trimingham, !e Su" Orders of Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
 77 For more history on this topic, see Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 33–64.
 78 Tariaq is the Su! method of instruction.
 79 For general information on this distinction, see Haroon, Frontier of Faith.
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of Islam through the eyes of the ulema and the Su!s became increasingly important again during 
the twentieth century, particularly during the formation of the Afghan state and during the anti-
Soviet jihad. John Esposito describes the rise of Su!sm in this way: 
Reacting with disdain and dismay to the worldly seductions of imperial Islam, 
they were motivated by a desire to return to what they regarded as the purity 
and simplicity of the Prophet’s time and driven by a deep devotional love of 
God that culminated in a quest for a direct, personal experience of the presence 
of God in this life.80
Su!sm a#ects rural Muslims in southern Afghanistan in a variety of ways. For example, the 
prevalence of ziarats (shrines) built over the graves of alleged holy men and women can be found 
throughout the south, and many venerate them. In the absence of real medicine or doctors, 
villagers place their faith in a culture of miracles and signs instead—here Su! mysticism plays a 
role. A nuanced understanding of the interplay between the religious and the political phenomena 
in southern Afghanistan should include an appreciation of the importance of these beliefs to the 
vast majority of people.81 "is also has implications for understanding aspects of the Taliban. A 
recent article published on the BBC’s news with the headline “Can Su! Islam Counter the Taliban?” 
described the experiences of visiting a Su! shrine in Pakistan and talking to various experts and 
locals about the alleged relationship between the Taliban and Su!sm.82 A$er the explosion at 
the tomb of Rahman Baba, the much-loved Pashtu Su! poet, there were many more articles to 
this e#ect.83 Is Su!sm a force, these articles asked, which can stand up against radicalism and 
so-called Talibanism? In the West, this has been a seductive idea for scholars and think-tanks, 
many of whom are familiar only with the tamer variants of Su!sm. "e increasing number of 
attacks targeting Su! shrines throughout South Asia is of particular concern. Groups operating 
in the Khyber Agency of the FATA, as well as in the Swat Valley, have repeatedly attacked Su! 
shrines and targeted Su! pirs for assassination over the last two years. "e shrine of Bahadur Baba, 
located in hills near Nowshera, east of Peshawar, was rocketed by militants in March—almost 
exactly one year a$er militants destroyed the 400-year-old shrine of Abu Saeed Baba, also near 
Peshawar.84 "e attacks have been attributed to Lashkar-i-Islam, a militant group based in Khyber 
and led by their charismatic and vehemently anti-Su! commander, Mangal Bagh. Demonstrations 
protesting the destruction of Su! shrines have created widespread distaste for local militant 
factions such as Lashkar-i-Islam, prompting some Su! elders such as Pir Samiullah to form tribal 
militias. Samiullah’s militia attacked Pakistani Taliban forces in the Swat Valley last year, killing 
approximately one hundred militants. Samiullah was killed by militants linked to the Taliban 
last December, who later exhumed and hanged his corpse in Mingora, the provincial capital. "e 
bloody clashes between Samiullah’s forces and Mullah Fazlullah’s Taliban !ghters in the Matta 
area of Swat have le$ hundreds dead since December.85 
 80 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 101.
 81 Many rural Pashtuns, particularly in the Katawaz, are very superstitious. "e Islam of swaths of rural Afghanistan has more in common with 
mysticism than is commonly supposed. "e role of djins, for example, is akin to that of evil spirits. "is aspect of Su!sm—the fear of rural 
peasants of the frightening mystical powers of the Su!s—is much more powerful than the adherence to Su! beliefs, which is negligible. 
 82 Barbara Plett, “Can Su! Islam Counter the Taleban?” BBC News, February 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7896943.stm. 
 83 Ghulam Dastageer, “Militants Blow Up Rehman Baba’s Shrine,” International News, March 26, 2009, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_
detail.asp?Id=20760.
 84 Tom Hussain, “Pakistani Taliban Target Su! Shrines,” National, March 10, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20090310/FOREIGN/157439541/1002.
 85 "e author would like to thank Matthew Dupee for contributing to this analysis.
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"e RAND Corporation published a study in 2003 that advocated encouraging “the elements 
within the Islamic mix that are most compatible with global peace and the international 
community and that are friendly to democracy and modernity.”86 "is study was widely rumored 
to be the public face of a U.S. intelligence community plan to “engage with Su!s” around the 
world as a strategy against Islamic radicalism. Such discussions fail to properly assess the realities 
of Su!sm as experienced on the ground in southern Afghanistan and approach the matter as 
if religious practices in Afghanistan are similar to those in Pakistan. "e two most important 
Su! orders in Afghanistan—the Qadiri and Naqshbandi—are organized into brotherhoods. Pir 
Sayyid Ahmad Gailani heads the Qadiri order, which consists primarily of Pashtuns of southern 
and eastern Afghanistan.87 "e Naqshbandi order of southern and northern Afghanistan is lead 
by the Mujaddidi family (Sebghatullah Mujaddidi).88 Additionally, the analysis of Su!sm’s main 
ideas and practices in these discussions is derived from a reading of classical texts (mainly poetry), 
which, while important, fails to give a proper picture of the way Su!sm interacts and has created 
religious networks.
Recognizing the importance of Su!sm in Afghanistan, the Taliban have attempted to manipulate 
certain Su! customs and traditions. Some Taliban have even sought to identify themselves as part 
of the Su! tradition.89 "is is similar to the dynamic that Bernt Glatzer describes of the “southern 
Pashtun tribesman seeking political leadership beyond his village” through the manipulation of 
“networks based on locality, economy, sectarianism, Su! orders, religious schools, political and 
religious parties and so on.”90 
Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani has stated that “a majority of Taliban are Su!s, mostly followers of the 
Qadiri and Naqshbandi movements.”91 Some analysts have even alleged that Mullah Mohammad 
Omar, the nominal leader of the movement, is a member and local leader of the Naqshbandi order. 
Although many experts intensely dispute this contentious claim, Gailani states “Mullah Omar was 
raised as a Su! before later embracing the more sever Wahhabi-inspired Islam.”92 Even a brief 
examination of the Taliban’s current propaganda output on its website, Al-Emarah, emphasizes that 
Taliban poetry and songs published in Pashtu rely strongly on the imagery, style, and forms used 
by the well-known classical Pashtun Su! poets. Further, the biographies of jihadi “martyrs” posted 
on the website and in Taliban magazines call to mind the Su! hagiographic traditions. Similarly, 
the authority of Mullah Omar’s leadership rests in part on his risky but brilliant propaganda move 
in 1996 of taking the khirqa (a garment that Afghans believe to be the Prophet Mohammed’s cloak) 
out of Kandahar’s royal mausoleum for the !rst time in 60 years and displaying it in a public rally 
 86 Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003).
 87 Gailani ancestor Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani founded the Qadiri order.
 88 "e Naqshbandi order formed the base of the Jebhe-yi Nejat party at the time of the Soviet invasion. "e Qadiri brotherhood formed the 
base of the Mahaz-i Melli party. "e Naqasbandi order originated in Bukhara during the fourteenth century.
 89 Interviews by Conrad Jennings in Kandahar City in 2007–08, however, suggested that the Taliban banned some Su! activities in Kandahar 
during their rule (1996–2001). "ese interviewees suggested that the Taliban opposed Su! groups. "ey argued that there was a huge 
contradiction between Taliban and the Su!s and that they did not like each other. "ese interviewees also mentioned that the Taliban did 
not respect the Su! shrines and mistrusted the pirs as well. 
 90 Bernt Glatzer, “Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?” in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn, 177–78.
 91 Farangis Najibullah, “Can Su!s Bring Peace to Afghanistan?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 5, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/
Can_Su!s_Bring_Peace_to_Afghanistan/1503303.html. "is article goes on to state that “One prominent Taliban !gure, Abdul Hakim 
Mujahed … says that the Taliban ‘consist of people from various backgrounds,’ and that while some ‘oppose’ Su!s, others have ‘great respect’ 
for them and are even followers.” 
 92 Najibullah, “Can Su!s Bring Peace to Afghanistan?”
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as a way to identify himself with the Prophet.93 Mysticism similar to that practiced by Su!s has long 
surrounded Mullah Omar. Omar reportedly started the Taliban a$er a dream in which Allah came 
to him in the shape of a man, asking him to lead the faithful. "e khirqa, for example, is believed 
by many Pashtuns to contain supernatural and mystical powers. "is action in part represented 
Omar’s absolute faith in his perceived divine right to rule and gave him legitimacy in his role 
as leader of the Afghan people ordained by Allah. A$er Omar showed the cloak of the Prophet 
Mohammad to those present and received general acceptance by public, he invited the people to 
accept him as their leader by raising hands.94 Whereas Omar had been a relative nonentity before 
this piece of religious theater, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical power. Soon 
a$erward, Omar was named Amir ul-Mumineen, “commander of the faithful”—not just of the 
Afghans but of all Muslims. He was given this title by almost 1,500 mullahs and religious scholars 
who were present in Kandahar.
As in Iraq, Su! groups in Kandahar have allied themselves with the insurgency since 2003. A 
signi!cant proportion of the rank-and-!le members of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan (and 
increasingly in Pakistan) believe in the local traditions and customs that are identi!ed as Su!.95 
Analyses of who the Taliban are and what they stand for have yet to convincingly o#er an account 
of the movement’s popular appeal, and fail to account for apparent Su! aspects of the movement. It 
seems clear that the tradition of Su!sm, rather than the practice (as associated with dervishes, for 
example), has been important in shaping the structure of rural resistance to secular authority. "e full 
extent of Su! contributions, however, to the networks that make up the insurgency in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan has not been properly explored, and there is not place here for a full discussion. It should 
be noted, though, that this is an important cultural feature that should not be underestimated.
Conclusion
!e lack of strategic innovation on the side of the international coalition 
is striking, and the di$culties in Afghanistan are in large part due to an 
intellectual failure to understand the country’s social and political dynamics.96
"e international community and, in particular, the U.S. and NATO forces have failed to 
thoroughly or systematically understand the religious foundations of the Taliban insurgency 
and jihad. Indeed, a rigorous and methodical examination of the Islamic realities of southern 
Afghanistan is potentially the most important arrow missing in the foreign forces’ quiver. 
Although this lack of understanding has direct implications for U.S. and NATO kinetic military 
operations, it is even more important to the information operations. A counterinsurgency is !rst 
and foremost an information war. One critical reason why the U.S. and NATO forces are not 
winning in Afghanistan is because they misunderstand certain components of the information 
 93 "e cloak had been folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar; “myth had it that the padlocks 
to the crypt could be opened only when touched by a true Amir ul-Mumineen, a king of the Muslims.” Joseph A. Raelin, “"e Myth of 
Charismatic Leaders,” BNET, March 2003, http://www.!ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0MNT/is_3_57/ai_98901483. For a discussion of 
this incident, see Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism, 20.
 94 Author’s interview of an eyewitness to Mullah Omar’s donning of the khirqa, Kandahar City, September 2008.
 95 Based on numerous interviews of Kandahris by Conrad Jennings, 2006–09.
 96 Giles Dorronsoro, “Running Out of Time: Arguments for a New Strategy in Afghanistan,” Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), 
University of Ottawa, CIPS Working Paper, no. 3, July 2009.
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battlespace—most importantly those that involve religious dynamics. How can the United States 
and NATO protect the people of Afghanistan—the central tenet of successful counterinsurgency—
if they do not understand the fundamental religious and societal drivers of the Afghan people?
Although this essay has merely scratched the surface of these extremely complex issues, it leaves 
no question that Islam and Islamic religious !gures continue to play a critical role in the everyday 
life and politics of southern Afghanistan. Today, Su!sm and Deobandism work together with 
traditional tribal mores in shaping the cognitive structures of southern Afghans. "ese beliefs, 
for the most part, in&uence the populations’ social, political, and economic interactions. Both 
government and Taliban insurgent leadership have attempted to both shape and act in accordance 
with these normative structures, as well as to develop narratives to achieve the support and 
acquiescence of the southern, mostly rural Pashtun population. Ultimately, however, the ongoing 
conditions of the con&ict environment that grips Afghanistan will most certainly in&uence and 
mix with these beliefs and narratives to alter the fabric of Afghan society and thus will be the !nal 
determinant as to the future path of Afghanistan.
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APPENDIX: TEX T OF ULEMA SHURA DECLARATION, KABUL, MARCH 19, 200997
"e National Council of Ulema in its regular session held from March 15–19, 2009, participated 
in by religious scholars from across Afghanistan passed the following Resolution a$er a thorough 
discussion of the current situation:
x"e Council denounces any action that further aggravates the pains and the su#erings of the 
people and funnels disunity among the people of Afghanistan. 
"us, the Council calls upon all those involved to prefer the national interests and Islamic 
values over their personal interests.
xTo ensure a full security as a key element in the country’s progress, the Council unanimously 
decided that the traditional Loy Jirga (Grand Assembly) be convened, where people from all 
circles including religious scholars, intellectuals, tribal leaders, Jihadi and political !gures and 
representatives from both Houses of the Parliament, the Taliban and Hiz e Islami (Hekmatyar’s 
Islamic Party) and from the OIC and the United Nations are represented.
x"e Council !nds as “reasonable” to obtain the agreement and endorsement of the neighboring 
countries and other relevant authorities on convening the Loy Jirga. We appreciate the interest 
already expressed by the new U.S. administration, Canada and France. For the anti-government 
forces to participate with con!dence in the Loy Jirga, we suggest that their names be removed 
from the blacklist and that the United Nations guarantee their safety.
x"e Council unanimously decided that the lead role in negotiating with the Taliban be given 
to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Bin Abdul 
Aziz Al Saud. Saudi Arabia is where the Holy Kabbah is located and is where the great Prophet 
of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH) is laid; it is where Quran was revealed by Allah and where angels 
have moved in and out. We are proud of the holy land and therefore, call upon the Custodian 
of the Two Holy Mosques to kindly accept our request of helping relieve our pains.
x"e Council calls upon the Taliban to allow the closed madrassas and schools to reopen for 
the Muslim children of Afghanistan. Children are involved neither in war nor in politics. Let 
them learn to move out of obscurity into the light. Closing down schools is a grave hostility 
against the Muslim people of Afghanistan. It is against the Holy Quran order that has allowed 
education. We are hoping for a positive response as this is the voice of the Council of Ulema, 
Ministry of Education and the entire nation.
x"e Council calls upon all the Ulema (religious scholars) to remain vigilant as they have 
always been against malign intentions and actions by those who seek to take advantage of an 
opportunity.
As several times reminded in the past, the Council once again urges the media to avoid 
preaching and airing prohibited and hypocrite anti-Islam programs and immoral scenes and 
movies. "is is the duty of the government to urgently avoid if such programs are aired.
With respect,
Afghanistan National Council of Ulema
 97 Obtained by the author from Conrad Jennings, who received this document from Kandahari religious elders in March 2009, Kandahar City. 
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